High School Drug Testing and the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment by Steinberg, David E.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 30
Number 3 Spring 2003 Article 1
1-1-2003
High School Drug Testing and the Original
Understanding of the Fourth Amendment
David E. Steinberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
David E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing and the Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment, 30 Hastings Const. L.Q. 263
(2003).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol30/iss3/1
High School Drug Testing and the Original
Understanding of the Fourth Amendment
by DAVID E. STEINBERG *
Table of Contents
I. Random Drug Tests and the Fourth Amendment ................ 265
A. The Road to Earls: Supreme Court Decisions
on Random Drug Tests ........................................... 265
B. Random Drug Tests in High Schools ..................... 267
1. A cton ........................................................ 268
2. E arls ......................................................... 269
3. Sum m ary ................................................... 270
II. The Original Understanding of the Fourth
A m endm ent ........................................................................ 270
A. The Controversies That Resulted in the
Fourth A m endm ent ................................................ 271
1. The John Wilkes Cases ............................ 273
2. Paxton's C ase ........................................... 274
3. The Townshend Act ................................. 276
4. Sum m ary .................................................. 277
B. Other Discussions of Unreasonable
Searches ................................................................. 277
C. The Ship Seizure Cases ......................................... 278
D. Nineteenth Century Search and Seizure Cases ....... 280
1. Banks and Sanford ................................... 282
Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. B.A., Northwestern University, 1982;
J.D., Stanford Law School, 1986.
More than anything else, my understanding of Fourth Amendment history has been
informed by two landmark historical works: William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment:
Origins and Original Meaning (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate
School) (on file with author) and Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999). Throughout the text of this essay, the reader will find
frequent, explicit references to the works of Cuddihy and Davies. However, neither those
references nor this footnote are adequate to indicate just how much I have benefited from the
work of these two fine scholars. My debt to these scholars is in no way mitigated by the fact that
I do not completely agree with their conclusions.
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Introduction
In Board of Education v. Earls,' the United States Supreme Court
recently upheld a random drug testing program for high school students. In
rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Earls majority concluded that
the important "governmental concern in preventing drug use" among high
school students outweighed the "minimally intrusive" impact on the
2
students' privacy.
The Court in Earls reached the correct result, but for the wrong
reason. A review of historical evidence indicates that the framers adopted
the Fourth Amendment to deal with a single, specific issue. The framers
sought to proscribe physical searches of residences pursuant to a general
warrant, or without any warrant at all. The Fourth Amendment simply
never was intended to govern the issues raised by random drug tests.3
The Earls Court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permits
random drug testing of public high school students is not quite correct.
Instead, the Fourth Amendment simply should not apply to high school
1. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
2. Id. at 834.
3. The Fourth Amendment interpretation that I advance in this essay is profoundly different
from the conclusions that I reached in my previous writings on the Fourth Amendment. In those
pieces, I argued for applying the warrant requirement to a variety of searches that did not involve
any physical entry into a residence. See David E. Steinberg, The Drive Toward Warrantless Auto
Searches: Suggestions From a Back Seat Driver, 80 B.U. L. REV. 545, 546 (2000) (asserting that
the Supreme Court's "abandonment of the warrant requirement for automobile searches is ill-
advised"); David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV.
563, 613-27 (1990) (suggesting a new approach for applying the warrant requirement to sense-
enhanced searches, which usually do not involve a physical entry into a residence).
Since I published these earlier pieces, my views on the Fourth Amendment have
changed very significantly. I attribute this change to both my more complete understanding of




Part I of this essay examines Fourth Amendment cases on random
drug tests decided prior to the Earls decision. Part I then discusses the
reasoning of the closely divided Earls Court. Part II reviews the original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Part II concludes that when the
framers adopted the Fourth Amendment, they never intended that the
amendment would provide a general framework governing all government
searches and seizures. Instead, the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment
solely to prohibit a single, specific practice: physical searches of private
residences conducted pursuant to a general warrant, or without a warrant at
all.
Part III considers the possibility of interpreting the Fourth Amendment
without reference to the original understanding. Part III expresses some
serious doubts about such an undertaking because there is no modem
consensus about whether particular police practices constitute an
unreasonable search. Finally, Part IV considers legislative restraints on
police behavior in a world where the Fourth Amendment no longer would
apply to all government searches and seizures.
I. Random Drug Tests and the Fourth Amendment
A. The Road to Earls: Supreme Court Decisions on Random Drug Tests
In several decisions prior to Earls, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the use of random drug tests to screen for controlled substances.
However, the Court has never given unconditional approval to random drug
tests. Instead, the Court has focused on two critical factors in random drug
test cases. First, random drug testing must be justified by the government's
special needs. Second, the state cannot use positive drug test results in
criminal prosecutions.
Prior to the Earls decision, the Court upheld random drug tests only in
special circumstances, where drug impairment would result in a high
degree of risk to someone other than the drug user. For example, in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,4 the Court upheld federal
regulations that mandated blood and urine tests for railway employees
following "a major train accident." 5 In rejecting a Fourth Amendment
challenge, the Skinner Court emphasized the government's "special needs"
in its regulation of the railroads.6 These "special needs" resulted from the
4. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
5. Id. at 609.
6. Id. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987)).
Siorin2 20031 HIGH SCHOOL DRUG TESTING
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
"government interest in ensuring the safety of the traveling public and of
the employees themselves."7
The Court also upheld random drug tests for certain types of Customs
Service employees in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.8
The Von Raab majority worried that a "drug user's indifference to the
[Customs] Service's basic mission or, even worse, his active complicity
with the malefactors, can facilitate importation of sizable drug shipments or
block apprehension of dangerous criminals." 9
Where the Court has not found any such special needs, the Justices
typically have held that random drug tests violate the Fourth Amendment.
In Chandler v. Miller,10 the Court invalidated a Georgia statute, requiring
that all candidates for state office must submit to a drug test. In holding
that this statute violated the Fourth Amendment, the Chandler majority
noted the absence of "any fear or suspicion of drug use by state officials." '
In addition to requiring that random drug tests respond to "special
needs," the Court has upheld random drug testing only where the
government does not use positive drug test results in criminal prosecutions.
In both Skinner and Von Raab, the Justices noted that drug test results
would not be used in criminal prosecutions. 12
Conversely, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,13 the Court struck
down a random drug test program for women receiving prenatal care.
Under the program reviewed in Ferguson, if a patient tested positive for
cocaine abuse and failed to follow through with a treatment program,
police officers would arrest the patient."4 In holding that this drug testing
program violated the Fourth Amendment, the Justices concluded that "the
central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the
use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse
treatment." 15
7. Id. at 621.
8. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
9. Id. at 670.
10. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
11. Id. at 319.
12. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (holding
that drug test results obtained by the customs service "may not be used in a criminal prosecution
of the employee without the employee's consent"); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989) (noting that blood, breath, and urine tests were not used "to assist in the
prosecution of employees," but instead were designed to prevent train accidents caused by
substance abuse).
13. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
14. Id. at 72.
15. Id. at 80.
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The decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, Chandler, and Ferguson reveal
significant disagreement and uncertainty about the constitutionality of
random drug tests. In three of these four cases, the Supreme Court reversed
lower courts.16 In Skinner, a federal appeals court concluded that a random
drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the random blood, breath, and urine
tests were permissible.' 7  In Chandler and Ferguson, federal appeals courts
had upheld random drug testing programs. Again, the Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that the drug testing programs violated the Fourth
Amendment. 1
8
Further, these Supreme Court decisions often have been sharply
divided. Von Raab was decided by a 5-4 vote, 19 with the four dissenters
20
arguing that the random drug test policy violated the Fourth Amendment.
Ferguson was decided by a 6-3 vote,2 ' with the three dissenters voting to
uphold the drug testing program. 2
B. Random Drug Tests in High Schools
As discussed below, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,23 the
Supreme Court upheld random drug testing of student athletes. With its
decision in Board of Education v. Earls,24 the Court extended Acton and
upheld random drug testing of all students who participated in extra-
25
curricular activities.
16. The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the federal circuit court only in Von
Raab. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Van Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
17. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd sub noma.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989).
18. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 532 U.S. 67, 86
(2001); Chandler v. Miller, 73 F.3d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
19. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 658.
20. See id. at 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69.
22. See id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
24. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
25. For other discussions of random drug tests in high schools, see Irene Merker Rosenberg,
Public School Drug Testing: The Impact ofActon, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 349 (1996); Jennifer Y.
Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow
the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997); John J. Bursch, Note, The
4 R's of Drug Testing in Public Schools: Random Is Reasonable and Rights Are Reduced, 80
MINN. L. REV. 1221 (1996); James M. McCray, Note, Urine Trouble! Extending
Constitutionality to Mandatory Suspicionless Drug Testing of Students in Extracurricular
Activities, 53 VAND. L. REV. 387 (2000); Linda Oshman, Comment, Public School Lessons:
Setting Limits on Suspicionless Drug Testing After Vemonia, 38 HoUS. L. REv. 1313 (2001).
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1. Veronia School District 47J v. Acton
The Supreme Court first considered random high school drug tests in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 26 During the 1980s, teachers in
Vernonia, Oregon witnessed a sharp increase in drug use among high
school students - particularly student athletes.27 As a result, the school
district adopted a random urine testing program, which applied to students
who participated in interscholastic athletics.28
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that these random drug tests
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.29 The
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the random drug
30testing program.
The Acton majority concluded that the random drug tests served
special needs. The Court determined that illicit drug use by high school
students was an important concern. 31 The majority asserted: "School years
are the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs are most severe. 32 Further, the majority emphasized that when
student athletes use illegal drugs, "the risk of immediate physical harm to
the drug user or those with whom he [or she] is playing his [or her] sport is
particularly high. 33
The Court held that these government interests outweighed any
privacy interests of the student athletes. 34 According to the majority, the
conditions for collecting urine specimens "are nearly identical to those
typically encountered in public restrooms, which men, women, and
especially schoolchildren use daily., 35 The Acton Court was particularly
skeptical about the privacy claims raised by student athletes because
student athletes change clothes and shower in communal locker rooms that
afford little privacy.36 In addition, the majority noted that the random drug
test results were "not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for
26. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
27. Students participating in interscholastic athletics were required to sign a form,
consenting to random urine testing. Each student athlete took a urine test at the beginning of the
season for their sport. In addition, the school tested ten percent of the student athletes each week.
The school did not turn over positive test results to law enforcement authorities. Id. at 648-51.
28. Id. at 650.
29. Id. at 652.
30. Id. at 665.
31. Id. at 660-65.
32. Id. at 661.
33. Id. at 662.
34. Id. at 664-66.
35. Id. at 658.
36. Id. at 657.
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any internal disciplinary function." 37
2. Board of Education v. Earls
In its 2002 decision in Board of Education v. Earls,38 the Court again
upheld a random drug testing program for high school students. The Earls
decision reviewed a very strange policy. Tecumseh High School mandated
random drug tests for any student who participated in competitive
extracurricular activities, but not for other students.3 9 Unlike the drug
testing policy in Acton, the Earls policy went beyond competitive
extracurricular athletics. The Earls policy applied to activities such as
choir, marching band, and the National Honor Society.n° In a sense, the
Earls policy seemed to punish students who voluntarily participated in
extracurricular activities, and could discourage other students from
participating in these activities.4'
Relying heavily on Acton, the United States Supreme Court held that
the random drug testing program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In
a 5-4 decision, the Court asserted that the students' privacy interest was
"limited in a public school environment. ''42 The Court also concluded that
"students who participate in competitive extracurricular activities
voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their
privacy as do athletes. 4 3 The majority emphasized that the test results
were "not turned over to any law enforcement authority. 4 4 Also, a positive
drug test only would have one consequence - the test results would bar a
student from participating in extracurricular activities.45
The Earls majority concluded that any privacy interests asserted by
the students were outweighed by the state interest in preventing drug abuse
among high school students.46 After citing statistics that showed illicit drug
use had increased in high schools, the Court concluded that "the nationwide
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every
37. Id. at 658.
38. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
39. Id. at 826.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (the random drug testing program in Earls "risks
steering students at greatest risk for substance abuse away from extracurricular involvement that
potentially may palliate drug problems").
42. Id. at 830.
43. Id. at 831.
44. Id. at 833.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 834-38.
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school. 'A7
Unlike prior cases that had upheld drug testing, the Earls decision did
not find any special circumstances that made random drug testing
particularly appropriate. While the majority did cite some evidence that
suggested occasional illicit drug use among Tecumseh High School
students,48 the majority admitted that no evidence demonstrated a
"particularized or pervasive drug problem" among the students involved in
extracurricular activities.49 Instead, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted
in dissent: "Nationwide, students who participate in extracurricular
activities are significantly less likely to develop substance abuse problems
than are their less-involved peers."
50
C. Summary
As in many other areas of Fourth Amendment law, the Supreme
Court's random drug test decisions often appear arbitrary and ad hoc. The
Court has upheld some programs, invalidated others. The Court frequently
has reversed lower court decisions in these opinions, illustrating the chaotic
and unpredictable state of the law. In random drug testing cases, the
Supreme Court itself often is closely divided.
In upholding random drug tests, the Court typically has focused on the
special need for drug testing in particular contexts, and representations that
the drug test results will not be used in criminal prosecutions. Neither of
these requirements finds any direct, explicit support in the language of the
Fourth Amendment. And the Court upheld the random drug testing
program in Earls, despite the government's failure to show any specific
evidence of "special needs."
Given the judicial disagreements about the constitutionality of random
drug tests, this area of Fourth Amendment law requires a reevaluation. The
subsequent historical review leads to a stark conclusion. The Fourth
Amendment should not apply in random drug testing cases at all.
II. The Original Understanding of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment was conceived to serve a single, specific
purpose - to prevent the physical search of residences without a warrant,
or pursuant to a general warrant. Courts may attempt to develop a coherent
regulation of random drug tests based on the Fourth Amendment, but such
47. Id. at 834.
48. Id. at 834-35.
49. Id. at 835.
50. Id. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
attempts are doomed to failure. The Fourth Amendment never was
intended to govern such controversies. With respect to the validity of
random drug tests in the public schools, the Fourth Amendment says
nothing at all.
My originalist argument is not based on the discovery of some new
historical evidence. All of the sources cited in this section will be familiar
to students of Fourth Amendment history. I am particularly indebted to the
research of Thomas Davies.51  However, I also have relied on the fine
historical scholarship of Akhil Reed Amar,52 William Cuddihy,53 Nelson
Lasson,54 Tracey Maclin, 55 and others.56
A. The Controversies That Resulted in the Fourth Amendment
When the framers of the Fourth Amendment proscribed unreasonable
searches and seizures, they intended to prohibit searches of residences
pursuant to a general warrant. The characteristics of a "general warrant"
are illustrated in Article X of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776,
the first American law to proscribe these warrants. Article X provided:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact
committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offence is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
51. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547 (1999).
52. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, The Writs of Assistance]; Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles]; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131 (1991) [hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution].
53. See William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with author).
54. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
55. See Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave
Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002) [hereinafter Maclin, Let
Sleeping Dogs Lie]; Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical
Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth
Amendment]; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse Than the Disease].
56. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 817 (1989); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707 (1996) (book review); Joseph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603 (1982); William J. Stuntz, The
Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393 (1995).
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grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.57
As illustrated by the Virginia declaration, the term "general warrant"
referred to warrants that contained either of two deficiencies. A warrant
would be inadequate if the document failed to specify the places to be
searched or the persons to be seized.5 8 A warrant also would be inadequate
if the document lacked adequate evidentiary support for the search or the
seizure.
As noted by Nelson Lasson, Thomas Y. Davies, and others,
discussions of unreasonable searches in the late eighteenth-century
primarily focused on three controversies - the John Wilkes cases in
England, Paxton's case in Boston, and American opposition to the
Townshend Act.59  All three controversies involved the use of general
warrants to search homes.6 ° Outside of these three examples, other
American discussions of unreasonable searches in the eighteenth century
focused almost exclusively on searches of homes pursuant to general
warrants.61
57. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. X, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS at 3814 (Francis N. Thorpe
ed. 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
58. The Virginia Declaration proscribed warrants that allowed law enforcement officials to
"seize any person or persons not named." Id.
59. See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 54, at 43-48 (discussing the John Wilkes cases); id. at 56-
67 (discussing Paxton's case); id. at 69-76 (discussing the Townshend Act). See also Davies,
supra note 51, at 561-67 (discussing these three controversies, and noting agreement among
subsequent commentators that these controversies represent the most important events leading to
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment).
60. General warrants lacked specificity. The warrants did not discuss where the officer
could search, what the officer could search for, or whom the officer could seize. Such warrants
could be obtained with little evidence of wrongdoing.
Conversely, the specific warrant was sworn out by a named complainant. If the search
did not produce evidence of a crime, the complainant was liable for trespass. The warrant could
be issued only by a neutral magistrate-usually a man of stature. Most significantly, the warrant
gave a specific command to the officer undertaking the search, thus limiting the officer's
discretion. See Davies, supra note 5 1, at 650-54 (contrasting the specific warrant with the general
warrant).
61. See, e.g., JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20 (1966) (describing how the Fourth Amendment
was enacted in response to English and American abuses, which had done violence to "the
ancient maxim that '[a] man's house is his castle').
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1. The John Wilkes cases
In the eighteenth century, the most well known examples of
unreasonable searches arose out of the English seditious libel prosecution
of John Wilkes and his supporters.62 This controversy began on April 23,
1763, with an anonymous letter printed in The North Briton, an opposition
periodical. The letter described the British Tory administration as
"wretched" puppets, and "the tools of corruption and despotism., 63
The Tory government eventually learned that the author of these
statements was John Wilkes, an opposition politician. The Tory
government accused Wilkes and his followers of disseminating seditious
publications.
Pursuant to a general warrant issued by the Tory Secretary of State,
English officers were directed to discover who was responsible for the libel
and search any places that might contain evidence. Relying on the general
warrant, the officers arrested Wilkes and several of his supporters.
Ultimately, the officers searched at least five houses and arrested at least 49
people pursuant to this single general warrant.64 Wilkes and his supporters
responded with at least thirty different trespass and false imprisonment
suits. 6
5
In a series of decisions issued between 1763 and 1769, English courts
ruled that these searches of homes pursuant to the general warrant violated
British common law. Juries ordered that the officers must pay damages to
Wilkes and the other search victims.
66
In the published opinions issued in the John Wilkes cases,67 British
judges emphasized that the searches pursuant to the general warrant had
been illegal because the officers had physically entered the homes of
Wilkes and his supporters without an adequate warrant. In Huckle v.
Money,68 Chief Justice Pratt refused to set aside a damages verdict won by
a printer, whose house had been searched pursuant to the general warrant.
Chief Justice Pratt's opinion included a scathing denunciation of the law
enforcement intrusion into the plaintiffs home. The Chief Justice wrote:
62. For a detailed account of the John Wilkes cases, see Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 886-927.
63. Id. at 886.
64. Id. at 893.
65. Id. at 894.
66. See LASSON, supra note 54, at 44-45 (describing the verdicts in the John Wilkes cases,
and noting that the English government's expenses in these cases "were said to total £ 100,000").
67. The published opinions that arose out of suits initiated by John Wilkes and his followers
include Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763); Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B.
1765); Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); and Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep.
768 (C.P. 1763).
68. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
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"To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to
procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish inquisition; a law under which
no Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring public
attack made upon the liberty of the subject."69
At the conclusion of the trial in the trespass case of Wilkes v. Wood,7°
Chief Justice Pratt again condemned the physical invasion of homes
pursuant to a general warrant. Chief Justice Pratt asserted that the
defendants claimed a right "to force persons houses, break open escrutores,
seize their papers, etc. upon a general warrant., 71  The Chief Justice
concluded that these actions were "totally subversive of the liberty of the
subject., 72
Similarly, in Entick v. Carrington,73 Chief Justice Pratt wrote that the
use of the general warrant "to enter a man's house, search for and take
away all his books and papers" violated common law principles.74 The
Chief Justice concluded that such a use of general warrants would "destroy
all the comforts of society. 75
Considerable doubt exists about the extent to which eighteenth-
century Americans had access to the opinions issued in the John Wilkes
cases. 7 6  However, the judicial condemnation of these home searches
received extensive publicity in British and American newspapers and
pamphlets.77
2. Paxton's case
The other two familiar examples of unreasonable searches in
eighteenth-century America involved writs of assistance - the American
equivalent of the English general warrant. Colonial authorities used the
writ to search for customs violations. The writ authorized customs officers
69. Id. at 769.
70. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
71. Id. at 498.
72. Id.
73. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765).
74. Id. at 818.
75. Id. at 817. By the time of the 1765 trial in Entick v. Carrington, Chief Justice Pratt was
known as Lord Camden. Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 919.
76. See Davies, supra note 51, at 565 n.25 (noting that the official reports of the John
Wilkes cases "were not published contemporaneously with the trials").
77. See, e.g., Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 927-37 (describing British publications that
opposed the use of general warrants in the John Wilkes cases); Davies, supra note 51, at 563
(describing British and colonial newspaper accounts of the John Wilkes cases, which emphasized
"the sanctity of the house while condemning general warrants"). See also LANDYNSKI, supra
note 61, at 29 (noting Chief Justice Pratt's popularity in England following his opinions in the
John Wilkes cases).
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to search any places where they suspected that smuggled goods were
hidden. The "writ of assistance" required that peace officers and any other
persons who were present must assist the customs officers in the
performance of the search.78
Charles Paxton was a Boston, Massachusetts customs officer. In
1755, Paxton sought and received a writ of assistance from the Superior
Court in Boston. Paxton sought to renew the writ in 1761 .79 Customs
officers believed that these writs empowered them to enter and inspect all
houses in Massachusetts. 0
In January 1761, an association of Massachusetts merchants filed a
petition with the Superior Court in Boston. The petition challenged the
writs of assistance. James Otis, a prominent Boston attorney, argued the
case on behalf of the merchants.8'
Otis argued that the writs of assistance operated as general warrants,
in violation of common law principles. Otis initially asserted that "the
freedom of one's house" was among "the most essential branches of
English liberty. 82 Otis then complained that with a writ of assistance,
customs officials "may enter our houses when they please.. .- may break
locks, bars and every thing in their way-and whether they break through
malice or revenge, no man, no court, can inquire .... "83
On November 18, 1761, the Superior Court in Boston ultimately
approved the continued use of the writs of assistance.84 Nonetheless, Otis's
argument against the writ was heralded by Americans increasingly
frustrated with British colonial rule. In Boston, John Adams and other
important statesmen attended Otis's argument.85 Some have described
Otis's argument against the writ of assistance as the most important single
event that led to the Revolutionary War.
86
78. See Davies, supra note 51, at 561 n.18.
79. See Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 760-63.
80. Id. at 759.
81. Id. at 765.
82. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978).
83. Id. In 1761, the common law argument advanced by Otis against the writs of assistance
was quite prescient. As discussed above, the first in a series of English court opinions rejecting
house searches pursuant to general warrants did not appear until 1763. See supra notes 62-77 and
accompanying text.
84. Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 798.
85. For John Adams's description of the argument made by Otis, see 10 THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (1856) [hereinafter THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS]. See also Davies, supra
note 51, at 561-62 n.20 (concluding that "Otis's argument was widely known in Boston," but
expressing uncertainty about whether news of the case reached the other colonies).
86. According to John Adams, during Otis's argument "American independence was then
and there born." THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 85, at 247-48. Adams also wrote that
Spinp, 20031 HIGH SCHOOL DRUG TESTING
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 30:3
It is significant that Otis argued only against house searches. As
Thomas Davies has noted, Otis's clients were "merchants who also owned
ships and warehouses. ' 7  But Otis did not challenge the searches of
warehouses or the seizure of ships-only the searches of homes.
88
3. The Townshend Act
In 1767, British Parliament reauthorized the writs of assistance for
custom searches through the Townshend Act.89 But given the profound
influence in America of the John Wilkes cases and Paxton's case, courts
issued the writs sporadically, and customs officers never executed the writs
effectively.
William Cuddihy describes the Townshend Act as "one of the most
arrant failures in American legal history." 90 Cuddihy continues: "In only a
few colonies did the courts issue the writs as general search warrants, and
the massive searches that those writs authorized were never implemented
on an effective scale." 91
Cuddihy identifies at least three different reactions to the Townshend
Act. First, in Massachusetts, judges actually issued the writs of assistance.
However, as a result of popular resistance, customs officers usually were
not able to execute effective searches pursuant to the writs.92 Second, in
colonies such as Rhode Island, Maryland, and South Carolina, judges either
ignored the writ applications, or repeatedly postponed considering these
applications.93  Finally, the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and
Connecticut attempted to transform the writs into specific search
warrants.9 4
Like the John Wilkes cases and Paxton's case, the opposition to the
Townshend Act focused on the use of a general warrant to search
residences. While the Townshend Act authorized general warrants in the
form of writs of assistance, customs agents had little success in obtaining or
executing these writs. By the time that England enacted the Townshend
Otis's attack on the writs of assistance was "the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of
Great Britain." Id.
87. Davies, supra note 51, at 602.
88. Id. at 601-02.
89. Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 1040.
90. Id. at 1046.
91. Id. See also LASSON, supra note 54, at 73 (stating that most colonial courts "refused to
grant general writs of assistance even after the Townshend Act had set at rest all technical
objections to their legality").
92. Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 1046-49.
93. Id. at 1056-57.
94. Id. at 1067.
Act in 1767, Americans profoundly had rejected home searches pursuant to
general warrants.
4. Summary
More than anything else, three major controversies led to the adoption
of the Fourth Amendment: the John Wilkes cases, Paxton's case, and the
Townshend Act.
In each case, the opponents of government action attacked physical
searches of homes pursuant to general warrants. The proponents of search
and seizure limitations spoke only of protecting houses from physical
intrusions. These statesmen simply did not discuss searches of businesses,
warehouses, or ships.95
B. Other Discussions of Unreasonable Searches
Like James Otis, early American statesmen referred almost
exclusively to searches of homes when they discussed unreasonable
searches. In 1772, Samuel Adams attacked the writ of assistance at a
Boston town meeting. Adams asserted: "Our homes and even our
bedchambers are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests & trunks broke
open ravaged and plundered by wretches.., whenever they are pleased to
say that they suspect there are in the house wares etc. for which dutys have
not been paid .... ,,96 Adams continued that customs officers "may break
,,97into the sacred rights of domicil, [and] ransack mens [sic] houses ....
95. The only significant pre-Revolutionary American challenges to non-residential searches
or seizures arose out of two ship seizure controversies, which involved ships owned by prominent
merchants Henry Laurens of South Carolina and John Hancock of Massachusetts. See Cuddihy,
supra note 53, at 1205-14. See also LASSON, supra note 54, at 72 (observing that in Boston
during 1768, "a riot resulted when John Hancock's sloop 'Liberty' was seized"). Davies
contends that these ship seizure controversies did not dispute "general search authority," but
instead involved challenges focused on "'customs racketeering' in the form of hypertechnical
applications of customs rules or forfeiture proceedings based on perjured testimony from
informers." Davies, supra note 51, at 604. Nonetheless, the ship seizure controversies provide
some support for arguments that the Fourth Amendment did not apply only to house searches.
See Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 55, at 962 (the ship seizure
controversies "helped to focus colonial thinking on the principle of probable cause").
As discussed below, early statutes passed by Congress permitted federal authorities to
seize ships without a warrant, and with minimal evidence of wrongdoing. Early Supreme Court
opinions upheld these broad ship seizure statutes. See infra text accompanying notes 105-112. In
light of these early ship seizure laws, it is hard to imagine that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to apply to ships.
96. A State of Rights of the Colonists, in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-
1776, 243 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967) (report typically attributed to Samuel Adams).
97. Id. at 244. Like James Otis, Adams made his argument in the seaport of Boston. Many
members of Adams's audience undoubtedly were merchants, who owned warehouses and ships.
Nonetheless, the remarks made by Adams do not refer to unreasonable searches of warehouses
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Similarly, Judge William Henry Drayton of Charleston complained in 1774
that "a petty officer has power to cause the doors and locks of any man to
be broke open, to enter his most private cabinet and thence to take and
carry away, whatever he shall in his pleasure deem uncustomed goods." 98
As William Cuddihy reports, addresses by the Continental Congress in
1774 provide particular insight into what the Framers viewed as
unreasonable searches and seizures. In a 1774 address to the American
people, the Continental Congress protested against the power of customs
officers "to break open and enter houses without the authority of any civil
magistrate founded on legal information." 99 In a 1774 letter to the
inhabitants of Quebec, the Congress warned that British customs officers
would break into "houses, the scenes of domestic peace and comfort and
called the castles of the English subjects in the books of their law."100
C. The Ship Seizure Cases
Both the Wilkes cases and Paxton's case challenged the searches of
residences. As illustrated by these court challenges, the original intent of
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment was to proscribe unwarranted house
searches.
Conversely, no one in early America disputed the propriety of
warrantless searches outside of residences. For example, during the early
nineteenth century, federal law enforcement officials regularly searched
and seized ships. But no court case considered that the Fourth Amendment
might apply to these ship seizures.
A review of colonial ship seizure cases confirms that the Fourth
Amendment was limited to searches of residences. Initially, it might
appear that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches and seizures of
vessels. In the 1789 Collections Act, Congress approved the warrantless
search of vessels for customs violations.' 0 One could argue that Congress
passed this statute to explain how the Fourth Amendment applied to ships.
Indeed in Carroll v. United States,10 2 Chief Justice William Howard Taft
and ships. In describing unreasonable searches, Adams only discussed searches of residences.
98. William Henry Drayton, A Letter From Freeman, in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 15 (R.W. Gibbes ed., 1855) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION].
99. Cuddihy, supra note 53, at 1116.
100. Id.at1117.
101. Collection Act of 1789, Ch.5, § 27, 1 Stat. 29, 43-44 (1789) (cited in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925)). The early American Congress also passed the Excise Act
of 1791, which authorized the warrantless entry into and inspection of all buildings that had been
registered as liquor storerooms or distilleries. Excise Act of 1791, 1 Stat. 199 (1791).
102. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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relied on the Collections Act in concluding that the Fourth Amendment was
intended to apply to vessels. 10 3 Carroll held that the Fourth Amendment
permitted warrantless searches of automobiles.1
0 4
However, a different interpretation of the 1789 Collections Act is
more plausible. The act may have codified what everyone already
understood-that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to searches
of vessels. If the amendment did not apply, then the warrant requirement
contained in the amendment also was not applicable.
The accuracy of this second reading is supported by early American
cases where federal officers seized ships. Often, the liberal provisions
authorizing these ship seizures seemed at odds with the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. But not only were the
statutes authorizing warrantless ship seizures upheld in these cases, the
Fourth Amendment never even was raised as an attack on these ship
seizures.
In Little v. Barreme,0 5 the United States Supreme Court considered
the seizure of a ship pursuant to a federal statute, which gave federal
officers the "right to stop and examine any ship or vessel of the United
States on the high seas" if "there may be reason to suspect" that the vessel
was sailing to France. 10 6  Under modem readings of the Fourth
Amendment, such broad seizure powers would be highly suspect.
But a Fourth Amendment argument did not merely fail in Little; the
amendment wasn't even mentioned in the case. The Supreme Court
ultimately found the seizure in Little improper, but only because the statute
passed by Congress did not authorize a seizure of this particular type of
ship. 0 7 Little contains no suggestion that the ship seizure statute violated
the Fourth Amendment, or any other provision of the Constitution.
In The Apollon,'0 8 the United States Supreme Court dealt with the
seizure of a vessel under a 1799 statute. The statute authorized ship
seizures where a vessel arriving from a foreign port failed to report to a
United States customs collector.'09 The Court held that the 1799 statute did
not apply because the vessel passed through United States waters to dock in
103. Id. at 150-51.
104. Id. at 149-59.
105. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
106. Id. at 177.
107. Id. at 179. Congress had authorized only the seizure of ships sailing from America to
France. Id. at 177. The vessel in Little was sailing from France to America. Id. at 176.
108. 22 U.S. 362 (1824).
109. Id. at 368.
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Florida, at that time a territory of Spain."
0
The Apollon involved another statute that today might seem to run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures. But once again, neither the Court nor the parties even mentioned
the Fourth Amendment."'
Why isn't the Fourth Amendment mentioned in these ship seizure
cases? The most likely explanation is that both the attorneys and the
Justices understood that the Fourth Amendment simply did not apply to
searches or seizures of ships. The amendment applied to searches of homes
- and that was all.
12
D. Nineteenth Century Search and Seizure Cases
A review of nineteenth century search and seizure cases supports the
conclusion that the framers intended to limit the Fourth Amendment to
physical entries of houses. First, very few nineteenth-century cases
involved a constitutional challenge to searches or seizures. In both the
federal courts and the state courts, constitutional search and seizure
provisions probably were mentioned in fewer than 50 cases." 3  If the
Framers intended that the Fourth Amendment would impose a
"reasonableness" requirement on all government searches and seizures, the
failure of attorneys and courts to discuss the amendment is hard to
110. Id. at 371.
11. I have focused on the ship seizure cases, because these cases involved an exercise of
federal power. However, Gerard Bradley has noted that both early state and federal laws
frequently authorized warrantless searches. Gerald V. Bradley, Present at the Creation? A
Critical Guide to Weeks v. United States and Its Progeny, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1031, 1041-46
(1986). Bradley writes: "Warrantless searches, then as now, were the rule rather than the
exception, and each of the thirteen colonies, and then the states, as a common statutory practice,
authorized them." Id. at 1041. Bradley then cites a litany of colonial, state, and federal laws that
did indeed authorize warrantless searches and/or seizures. Id. at 1041-45 nn.64-65.
But none of the statutes cited by Bradley authorized warrantless searches of a residence.
Bradley's examples thus seem to support my contention that the Fourth Amendment was intended
to apply only to physical searches of residences.
112. Tracey Maclin observes that although two sections of the Collections Act authorized
warrantless searches of ships, a third section required a specific warrant before customs agents
could search buildings. Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 55, at 963.
However, it is not clear how this statutory scheme supports Maclin's contention that the Fourth
Amendment contains a "warrant preference rule," which extends beyond physical searches of
houses. Id. at 955. If the Fourth Amendment already governed searches and seizures aboard
ships and in warehouses, then Congress presumably would not need to pass a statute regulating
such searches and seizures. The most plausible inference from the Collections Act is that the
Fourth Amendment simply did not govern searches of ships and warehouse. For this reason,
Congress enacted legislation that would govern such searches.
113. See Davies, supra note 51, at 611-19.
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Admittedly, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution only applied to the federal
government. 1 5 During the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth
century, most criminal laws were enacted by the states, and not by the
federal government." 6  Initially, one might attribute the dearth of
constitutional search and seizure rulings to the fact that most criminal
prosecutions took place in the state courts, where the Fourth Amendment
did not apply.
However, this explanation is not satisfactory. During the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, most state constitutions contained search and
seizure provisions, using language that was very similar or identical to the
Fourth Amendment." 7  And yet published state court opinions rarely
mentioned these state constitutional search and seizure provisions. And
when the state constitutional provisions were mentioned, state courts
typically concluded that government action had not violated these search
and seizure provisions.
Why weren't attorneys and judges in state courts discussing the state
constitutional search and seizure provisions? The most plausible answer is
that, like the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
reach of these state provisions was limited. The state provisions only were
intended to proscribe physical entries into homes without a specific
warrant. With respect to other government searches and seizures, the state
constitutional provisions were just as inapplicable as the Fourth
Amendment.
Early challenges to warrantless arrests support this conclusion. In the
1814 case of Wakely v. Hart," 1 8 Wakely argued that his warrantless arrest
114. See id. at 613 ("Federal courts rarely addressed the Fourth Amendment during the
nineteenth century. That in itself is strong evidence that the amendment was not understood to be
a comprehensive regulation of searches and arrests in that period...").
115. See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 76 (1855) (rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge
to a Maryland state statute, because the Fourth Amendment applied only to the federal
government).
116. See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 54, at 106 (noting that during the nineteenth century, "the
limited criminal jurisdiction of the Federal Government was not exercised by Congress except in
minor instances"); Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 39, 40 (1996) (noting that federal criminal
law initially had a very limited scope, and specified only 17 offenses); Thomas J. Maroney, Fifty
Years of Federalization of Criminal Law: Sounding the Alarm or 'Crying Wolf?,' 50 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1317, 1319-20 (2000) (noting that because the eighteenth-century federal government
was "small and conducted few programs, the list of offenses was short").
117. See Davies, supra note 51, at 674-86.
118. 6 Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814).
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had violated a Pennsylvania constitutional provision that prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures. 119 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
quickly rejected this argument. 120  Similarly, in the 1817 case of Mayo v.
Wilson,121 the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote that a warrantless
arrest did not violate the New Hampshire Constitution, which prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures.
122
In addition, three nineteenth-century cases are particularly relevant to
the historical argument advanced in this essay - Banks v. Farwell,
123
Sandford v. Nichols,124 and Weimer v. Bunbury.125
1. Banks v. Farwell and Sandford v. Nichols
In the 1838 Banks case, Banks had confessed to a theft. A police
officer subsequently entered Banks's shop without a warrant to retrieve the
stolen property.126  Although the Massachusetts Constitution prohibited
unreasonable searches and seizures, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court concluded that the warrantless search of the shop did not violate this
constitutional provision. 
27
Banks contrasts with Sandford, another challenge to a police search
decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in the early
nineteenth century. 128 In Sandford, a law enforcement officer searched
Thomas Sandford's house for smuggled goods. The officer had obtained a
warrant. But because the warrant did not describe the goods with sufficient
particularity, the warrant was defective. Sandford subsequently brought a
trespass suit. 129
In Sandford, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
trial court erred in admitting the improper warrant into evidence. The
Justices ordered a new trial for Sandford's trespass action. 30  The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also strongly intimated that
Sandford would succeed in a trespass action, but expressed doubt about
119. See Davies, supra note 51, at 615 (describing Wakely v. Hart as "probably the most
widely cited early American case on the law of arrest").
120. Wakely, 6 Binn. at 318.
121. 1 N.H. 53 (1817).
122. Id. at 59-60.
123. 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156 (1838).
124. 13 Mass. (13 Tying) 286 (1816).
125. 30 Mich. 201 (1874).
126. Banks v. Farwell, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 156, 156-57 (1838).
127. Id. at 159-60.




whether Sandford could prove substantial damages.1
3 1
In Banks, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a search
was lawful, even though the police officer executing the search had not
obtained a warrant. In Sandford, the same court suggested that a search
was probably unlawful, because the law enforcement officer had obtained a
defective warrant. But unlike the officer in Banks, the officer in Sandford
at least had made the effort to obtain a warrant.
The obvious difference between Banks and Sandford was the place
that the officers were searching. The officers in Banks were searching a
business, while the officers in Sandford were searching a home. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court probably required a warrant only in
Sandford because Sandford involved a physical entry into a house, and
Banks did not.
2. Weimer v. Bunbury
In the 1874 case of Weimer v. Bunbury, 32 the Michigan Supreme
Court reviewed a state statute, which allowed the state to issue a "warrant"
authorizing the repossession of property owned by delinquent tax
collectors. The plaintiff contended that this statute violated a Michigan
state constitutional provision, which proscribed unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Weimer Court rejected the plaintiffs contention and upheld
the statute. The Court wrote that the search and seizure provision in the
Michigan state constitution was intended for "something quite different
from an open and public levy upon property after the usual method of
execution levies."
'1 33
The Court continued that the state constitutional search and seizure
provision "was to make sacred the privacy of the citizen's dwelling and
person against everything but process issued upon a showing of legal cause
for invading it."' 134 Notably, the Weimer opinion was written by Justice
Thomas Cooley, a prominent commentator on the United States
Constitution. 135
131. Id. at 289-90.
132. 30Mich. 201 (1874).
133. Id. at 208.
134. Id.
135. See generally THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1st ed.
1868).
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3. Summary
If the constitutional search and seizure provisions were designed to
provide broad regulation of police activity, one would expect nineteenth-
century court opinions to discuss these provisions. Instead, nineteenth-
century courts rarely mentioned the constitutional search and seizure
provisions. Further, the results in the few reported opinions are consistent
with the argument advanced in this essay - that the Fourth Amendment
was intended only to proscribe physical entries into the home, either
pursuant to a general warrant, or without any warrant at all.
E. The Modern Misreading of the Fourth Amendment: Boyd and Katz
The Supreme Court took a significant step down the wrong path in its
first Fourth Amendment decision, Boyd v. United States.'36 The Boyd
decision struck down a statute, which authorized courts to order the
production of business records. 137 The Boyd Court held that the statute
violated the Fourth Amendment. 1
38
In the majority opinion, Justice Joseph P. Bradley cited almost no
authority for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protected business
records. 139  Justice Bradley made liberal references to the argument of
James Otis in Paxton's case, and to the John Wilkes cases. 140  Yet as
Justice Bradley explicitly recognized in Boyd, those controversies involved
the warrantless searches of residences.141 In his summary of early
American grievances, Justice Bradley wrote in Boyd: "Prominent and
principle among these was the practice of issuing general warrants by the
Secretary of State, for searching private houses for the discovery and
seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner of the
charge of libel."'
142
The Boyd case is best understood as a decision from the late
nineteenth century, when the Supreme Court used the Constitution to shield
business owners from government regulation. 143  Cases such as Boyd
136. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
137. Id. at 632.
138. Id.
139. See Davies, supra note 51, at 728 (describing "the novelty of [Justice] Bradley's specific
claims"); id. at 727 n.512 (describing Justice Bradley's account of the original understanding of
the Fourth Amendment as "fanciful at best").
140. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-26.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 625-26 (emphasis added).
143. See Davies, supra note 51, at 739 (Justice Bradley's assumption that the Fourth
Amendment extended to commercial interests "reflects the pro-business activism of the late
nineteenth - and early twentieth-century Supreme Court - not the original understanding of the
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ultimately would culminate in the Court's use of substantive due process to
strike down government regulations of businesses, including the notorious
decision in Lochner v. New York. 44
The Court's error in Boyd was compounded significantly in Katz v.
United States.'4  In a decision that serves as the foundation for modem
Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
proscribed the use of a warrantless wiretap to monitor a suspect's phone
calls made from a public telephone booth. 46 In striking down the
warrantless wiretap, the Katz Court overruled Olmstead v. United States.147
The Olmstead Court had concluded, correctly, that a wiretap typically
would not violate the Fourth Amendment because the wiretap did not
involve any physical entry into a residence.148
In overruling Olmstead, the Katz majority asserted that Fourth
Amendment protections "do not vanish when the search in question is
transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of
a telephone booth.', 149 The Katz majority concluded that "electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."
50
Justice John Harlan's landmark concurrence in Katz ultimately would
prove more important than the Katz majority opinion.'5 ' Justice Harlan
introduced a two-part test that has become the basis for determining
whether the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to obtain a warrant.
Justice Harlan's test provided that first "a person must have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation
[must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."" '152
[Fourth] Amendment").
144. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For discussions of substantive due process in the nineteenth century
and early twentieth century, see generally John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the
Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493 (1997). See also, Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era
Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991); Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
145. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
146. Id. at 349-59.
147. Id. at 353.
148. 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (the government's wiretap did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, because there was "no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants").
149. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.
150. Id. at 353.
151. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 361.
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Both the Katz majority opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence
completely failed to make any reference to the original understanding of
the Fourth Amendment. Because the Katz decision involved a major
revision of Fourth Amendment law, the Court's failure to discuss the
Amendment's origins is hard to understand.
However, in his Katz dissent,' 53 Justice Hugo Black did demonstrate
attention to history. Justice Black wrote that if the Framers "desired to
outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe
that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth
Amendment."' 154  Justice Black insisted that the Court should remain
faithful to the text and the history of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Black
asserted that the Court should not "rewrite the [Fourth] Amendment in
order 'to bring it into harmony with the times' and thus reach a result that
many people believe to be desirable."'
' 55
The Katz decision is not completely ahistorical. The Framers objected
to searches of homes pursuant to general warrants because those searches
invaded a resident's privacy. When Judge William Henry Drayton of
Charleston complained in 1774 that any petty officer could break open a
homeowner's doors and "enter his most private cabinet and thence to take
and carry away, whatever he shall in his pleasure deem uncustomed
goods,"' 56 Judge Drayton was complaining about an invasion of privacy.
But Katz and subsequent modem cases fail to acknowledge that when
the Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment, the Framers sought to
proscribe only unreasonable physical intrusions into private residences.
The amendment simply was not intended to regulate searches of ships,
businesses, warehouses, or any of the other places outside of a residence
where a person might have some expectation of privacy. In concluding that
the Fourth Amendment governs searches that do not involve a physical
intrusion into a residence, 57 the Katz opinion reached a result inconsistent
with the Framers' original understanding.
153. Id. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 366.
155. Id. at 364.
156. Drayton, supra note 98, at 15 and accompanying text.
157. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment does not "turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure").
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F. Summary
Today, the Supreme Court presumes that the Fourth Amendment
applies to almost every government search and seizure. 158 After asserting
that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures conducted by
the government, the Court considers whether a particular search and seizure
is reasonable. Sometimes the Court requires a warrant. 159  In other
situations, the Justices only require that police officers possess probable
cause. 160 And the Court has permitted some searches and seizures - such
as random drug tests - where police officers do not possess either a
warrant or probable cause. 
161
As the preceding discussion illustrates, this reading of the Fourth
Amendment is completely inconsistent with the original intent of the
Framers. No evidence suggests that the Framers intended the Fourth
Amendment to impose some sort of general reasonableness requirement on
all searches and seizures. In fact, the Framers' intent in enacting the Fourth
Amendment is surprisingly clear. The Fourth Amendment was intended
solely to regulate physical entries of residences by government agents. The
amendment proscribed warrantless searches of residences, and searches of
residences pursuant to a general warrant. 62 With respect to government
158. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (the Fourth
Amendment usually applies to government searches and seizures). But cf Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (a search of the open fields "is not one of those 'unreasonable
searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment").
159. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-41 (2001) (before police officers use a thermal
imaging device to measure the heat radiating from a suspect's residence, the officers first must
obtain a warrant); Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-59 (before police officers use a wiretap to eavesdrop on a
suspect's telephone conversations, the officers first must obtain a warrant).
160. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 387-95 (1985) (police officers need not obtain a
warrant prior to searching an automobile, but the officers usually must possess probable cause).
161. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618-33 (upholding random drug tests of railway workers,
conducted without a warrant or probable cause); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15
(when police officers view a suspect's backyard from an airplane, the officers need not possess a
warrant or probable cause).
162. Thomas Davies also argues that the historical concerns resulting in the Fourth
Amendment "were almost exclusively about the need to ban house searches under general
warrants." See Davies, supra note 51, at 551, 642-50 (emphasizing the sanctity of the home in
eighteenth-century America). However, I disagree with Davies on at least two points.
First, Davies concludes that the sole purpose of the Fourth Amendment was "banning
Congress from authorizing use of general warrants." Id. at 724. "In other words, the Framers did
not address warrantless intrusions at all in the Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state
provisions." Id. at 551.
In concluding that the Fourth Amendment did not address warrantless searches, Davies
relies at least in part on his observation that "the historical record of prerevolutionary grievance
reveals no legal complaints" about warrantless searches. Id. at 603. However, the lack of debate
about warantless searches likely occurred because in early America, "the common law apparently
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searches and seizures that did not involve physical intrusions into
residences, the Fourth Amendment simply was inapplicable.163
provided nojustification for a search of a house beyond the ministerial execution of a valid search
warrant." id. at 649. In other words, everyone agreed that warrantless house searches were
impermissible. Even when faced with epidemic smuggling in eighteenth-century America,
customs officers would not enter a home without a court-authorized writ of assistance.
According to Davies's reading of the Framers' intent, a search of a house pursuant to a
general warrant would be an "unreasonable search," as that term is used in the Fourth
Amendment. However, Davies asserts that a warrantless house search would not be an
unreasonable search, at least for Fourth Amendment purposes. Given the profound common law
rejection of warrantless house searches, I cannot agree with Davies's conclusion that the Fourth
Amendment did not proscribe such searches.
Second, Davies and I disagree on the implications of the Framers' original intent for
current Fourth Amendment doctrine. Davies believes that a return to the original understanding
of the Fourth Amendment "would subvert the purpose the Framers had in mind when they
adopted the text." id. at 741. Davies accepts the Supreme Court's rewriting of the Fourth
Amendment because today law enforcement officers exercise "a level of discretionary authority
that the Framers would not have expected a warrantless officer could exercise unless general
warrants had been made legaL" Id.
Of course, unrestrained police discretion is undesirable. However, Davies does not
explain why the most appropriate approach to limit police discretion is for nine Supreme Court
Justices to rewrite the Fourth Amendment in whatever way seems best at the time. Police
discretion could be constrained by the elected officials that supervise police departments, by
statutes, or by amendments to state constitutions or the federal constitution.
The current incoherence of Fourth Amendment doctrine raises profound doubts about
Fourth Amendment activism, with judges attempting to control police discretion by reinventing
the amendment In my opinion, Fourth Amendment doctrine is such a mess because well-
intentioned judges have invoked the amendment in situations where it never was intended to
apply.
163. Akhil Amar advocates an interpretation of Fourth Amendment history that is quite
different from the account presented in this essay. Amar has advanced his historical account in a
series of law review articles. See, ag., Amar, The Writs of Assistance, supra note 52; Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 52; Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution,
supra note 52, at 1775-81.
Amar's historical argument rests on two critical propositions. First, like the current
Supreme Court, Amar asserts that the Framers intended that the Fourth Amendment would
impose a global reasonableness requirement on all searches and seizures. Amar, Fourth
Amenhnent First Principles, supra note 52, at 801-04. Second, Amar asserts that the Framers
actually disfavored searches pursuant to any warrant, general or specific. Id. at 771-80.
According to Amar, the Framers did not view the warrant process as protecting against
unreasonable searches. Instead, civil trespass suits offered the primary protection from such
searches. Id. at 774. Amar contends that the Framers disfivored warrants, because a warrant
would provide "an absolute defense in any subsequent trespass suit" Id. Amar concludes:
"Judges and warrants are the heavies, not the heroes, of our story." Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, supra note 52, at 1179. See also TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUD1ES IN
CONSTITOmONAL INTERPRETATION: SEIZURE AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS 41 (1967) (also arguing that the Framers viewed all warrants as "an enemy").
It is not possible to present a comprehensive analysis of Amar's sophisticated historical
argument in a footnote. However, one observation may be worth considering. Amar's
generalized reasonableness account requires two conclusions about the Framers' views on search
and sizure law. First, the Framers concluded that warrantless physical searches of residences
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Il1. Interpreting the Fourth Amendment Without Reference to
the Original Understanding
When the Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment, they never could
have envisioned random drug tests. Therefore, one might conclude that
historical evidence is not helpful with such problems. Instead one should
look to some modem notions about reasonableness, and search for some
consensus about random drug testing.164
At least with respect to random drug tests, any attempt to discover
some modem consensus is doomed to failure. Currently, no consensus
exists as to when, if ever, random drug testing is "reasonable."
Consider the very different voting patterns of Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justice David H. Souter. At least with respect to Fourth
Amendment cases that have come before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
sometimes could be reasonable. Second, the Framers concluded that warrantless searches outside
of residences sometimes could be unreasonable.
However, the historical record offers no support for either of these propositions. There
is simply no evidence that the Framers ever intended to permit warrantless physical searches of
houses. Even when seeking to prosecute the authors of the inflammatory publications in the John
Wilkes cases, the Tory administration in England did not dare order law enforcement officers to
enter houses without some kind of a warrant. Instead, the Tory Secretary of State obtained a
general warrant. See supra notes 61-77 and accompanying text. Contrary to Amar's suggestion,
"the common law apparently provided no justification for a search of a house beyond the
ministerial execution of a valid search warrant." Davies, supra note 5 1, at 649.
Amar's suggestion that some searches outside of a residence could be unreasonable is
equally ahistorical. In researching early American court opinions on search and seizure law, I
have not found a single case prior to the 1880s holding that a government search or seizure
occurring outside of a home was an unreasonable search. The first suggestion that such searches
could violate the Fourth Amendment did not appear until Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
No one disputes Amar's abilities or as a writer or an advocate. However, a number of
Fourth Amendment scholars profoundly disagree with Amar's reading of history. See, e.g.,
Davies, supra note 51, at 575 n.63 ("Amar is an engaging writer, but his treatment of text and
history is often loose and uninformed."); Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 55, at 929 ("Amar provides an incomplete account of the [Fourth] Amendment's
history."); Cloud, supra note 56, at 1739 (Amar "selectively deploys incomplete fragments of the
historical record to advance a partisan thesis").
164. For arguments that modem notions of reasonableness should influence Fourth
Amendment doctrine, see Yale Kamisar, The Writings of.John Barker Waite and Thomas Davies
on the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1821, 1865 (2002) (arguing that
"changing times and changing circumstances seriously undermined the presuppositions and
expectations regarding the drafting and adoption of the search and seizure provision"); Maclin,
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, supra note 55, at 897 (arguing that the Supreme Court should "stop
considering the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment unless it is able to develop a more
effective and consistent method by which to do so"); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994) (asserting that "the construction of the
Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness' clause should properly change over time to accommodate
constitutional purposes more general than the Framers' specific intentions").
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Rehnquist never has seen a random drug testing program that he didn't like.
Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to uphold random drug testing programs in
all six of the cases the Court has heard. Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed
with a Court majority to uphold the random drug testing programs in
Skinner, Van Raab, Acton, and Earls.165 When the majority struck down
random drug testing programs in Chandler and Ferguson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented. 1
66
Conversely, Justice Souter never has voted to uphold a random drug
testing program. Justice Souter has participated in four of the Court's six
random drug testing cases. In Chandler and Ferguson, Justice Souter
agreed with the majority that random drug testing programs violated the
Fourth Amendment. 67  When the majority upheld random drug testing
programs in Acton and Earls, Justice Souter dissented.
68
So which of these two Justices is the "reasonable" person, with respect
to random drug tests? Is it Justice Rehnquist, who consistently votes to
uphold random drug testing programs? Or is it Justice Souter, who
consistently concludes that such programs violate the Fourth Amendment?
The lack of any consensus extends beyond the divergent views of
these two Justices. In Acton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
requiring student athletes to take random drug tests violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, and upheld
the drug testing program. 169 In Earls, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that requiring students who participate in extracurricular activities to
take random drug tests violated the Fourth Amendment. 70  Again, the
Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, and held that the drug testing
program was constitutional.
The debate about random drug testing almost certainly is not limited
to federal judges. Different people will have different perspectives about
what constitutes a reasonable search. 17 1  A prosecutor's view of what
165. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives Union, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
166. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 91 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(joined by Rehnquist, J. and Thomas, J.); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
167. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67; Chandler, 520 U.S. at 305.
168. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 842 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Souter, J.); id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J., O'Connor, J., and Souter, J.); Acton, 515 U.S. at
666 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, J. and Souter, J.).
169. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 66 F.3d 217 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
170. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 300 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
171. For arguments that public high schools should be able to conduct random drug tests, see
William J. Bennett, A Victory for 'Ordered Liberty,' WALL ST. J., July 1, 2002, at A14
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constitutes a reasonable search will differ from the views of a public
defender. A police officer's view of what is reasonable will differ from the
views of a low-income housing resident, who frequently is hassled (or
worse) by police officers. And so on. 172
Consensus on what constitutes an "unreasonable search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes may be limited to a fairly narrow fact pattern. There
may indeed be a popular consensus that warrantless physical searches of
homes are per se unconstitutional, absent some emergency or other
extraordinary circumstances. But beyond this agreement about the
impropriety of warrantless house searches, no current consensus exists with
respect to the proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
A search for a modem consensus about the Fourth Amendment thus
may reach the same result as a review of the original intentions of the
Framers. The Fourth Amendment only proscribes warrantless physical
searches of residences, and physical searches of residences pursuant to an
invalid warrant.
(permitting high schools to adopt random drug testing programs affirms that "local control is an
essential element" of education); Maybe Tecumseh Was Right, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 4, 2003,
at 6A (discussing an Oregon study, which indicated that random drug testing reduces illicit drug
use among high school students); Cathi Jeffrey, Drug Testing in Schools Is a Deterrent, QUINCY
PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 29, 2003, at 12 (random drug testing in high schools "has been proven to
decrease the likelihood of drug use").
For arguments opposing random drug testing in public schools, see No Logic in School
Drug Test, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, July 6, 2002, at 6 (random high school drug tests "abuse
student privacy rights while doing precious little to fight drugs"); Nolan Finley, Oklahoma
Student Stood Up for Liberty: People Shouldn't Let Her Stand Alone, DETROIT NEWS, July 7,
2002, at 11 (random high school drug tests violate "protections against privacy intrusions,
unreasonable searches and self-incrimination"); Ruling an Assault on Student Privacy, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, July 4, 2002, at 14A ("random drug testing of high school students participating
in extracurricular activities flunks the test of liberty").
172. See, e.g., Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 677, 706 (1998) (in Fourth Amendment cases, Supreme Court analysis
sometimes focuses on "police, hypothetical reasonable people, or individual citizens, whose
perspectives are utilized to resolve Fourth Amendment issues"); Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia
and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Individualism in Bostick v.
Florida, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1979, 2029 n.191 (1993) ("Scalia's approach to the Fourth Amendment
reflects a majoritarian white police perspective. It does not reflect the justified apprehension black
men have of police."); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1308 (1990) (contending that the Supreme
Court follows a "police-oriented, innocent-citizen perspective" in Fourth Amendment cases);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Internment, 70
FORDHAM L. REv. 2257, 2302 (2002) (discussing "minority community voices suppressed in the
judicial determination of Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness').
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IV. Search and Seizure In a World Without a Fourth
Amendment
In this essay, I advocate a reading of the Fourth Amendment that is
much narrower than the approach adopted by the modem Supreme Court.
Under this narrower reading, the Fourth Amendment simply would not
apply to controversies such as random drug testing. In the highly unlikely
event that the Supreme Court ever adopted such an interpretation, the
United States Constitution no longer would regulate most searches and
seizures. With few restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court, one might
worry that no one would regulate most law enforcement activities.
Actually, legislatures often have proven quite willing to impose
restrictions on law enforcement officers, when particular search techniques
generated real public concern. In the 1967 Katz decision, the Supreme
Court concluded that a warrantless wiretap violated the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. 173 But for practical purposes, the most
important restrictions on wiretapping appear in a federal statute enacted by
Congress - Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 ("Title III").174 Title III requires that the government obtain a court
order prior to installing a wiretap. 175 Title III specifies the requirements for
a wiretap application, 176 and the standards that a judge must use in
determining whether to grant the application. 177  Title III makes
unauthorized wiretapping a felony. 1
78
To date, the significant restrictions on the interception of internet
communications have derived from federal statutes, rather than from the
Fourth Amendment. With respect to Internet transmissions, the most
applicable statute probably is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA). 179 Among other things, the ECPA governs the use of any
"trap and trace" device - a device which "captures the incoming
electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number," or
other information that is "reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire
or electronic communication."' 80 Like the Title III restriction on wiretaps,
the ECPA permits the use of a trap and trace device only after the
173. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349-59 (1967).
174. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
175. Id. at § 2516(3).
176. Id. at § 2518(l).
177. Id.
178. Id. at § 2511.
179. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
180. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(4) (West Supp. 2003).
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government has obtained a court order.' 8' The ECPA specifies the contents
of an application for a trap and trace device,' 82 and the circumstances where
a court should permit the use of such a device.' 83 In short, in cases where
citizens feel the most profound concerns about intrusive searches, Congress
has passed statutes that constrain police activity.
Of course, it would be hopelessly naive to suggest that legislatures
always impose appropriate limitations on searches, or that police
overreaching never occurs. For example, the Earls decision arose out of an
Oklahoma school district policy that mandated random drug testing only
for students involved in extra-curricular activities, and not for other
students. 184 As already noted, this seems like a very strange policy. 85 It is
hard to understand why a school district would suspect illicit drug use
among members of the National Honor Society or the school choir - but
not among the general student population. 
86
In addition, some recent studies support the conclusion that police
officers may abuse their search powers. Specifically, some empirical
studies indicate that police officers are far more likely to stop and search
African-American drivers than white drivers. 187 Such studies suggest that
police officers sometimes act as a result of racial bias. This suggestion of
racial bias is deeply disturbing.
But even if one accepts that elected officials or police officers
sometimes will authorize intrusive searches, the Fourth Amendment is not
necessarily the cure for such problems. When the Framers enacted the
Fourth Amendment, they were not thinking of random drug tests, racially
biased traffic stops, or many other current law enforcement controversies.
181. Id. at § 3121(a).
182. Id. at § 3122(b).
183. Id. at § 3123(a). But cf Christian David Hammel Schultz, Note, Unrestricted Federal
Agent: "Carnivore" and the Need to Revise the Pen Register Statute, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1215, 1242-54 (2001) (asserting that existing federal statutes do not apply to the "Carnivore"
program, which tracks a user's internet activity).
184. Bd. ofEduc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826-27 (2002).
185. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
186. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187. See David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 279 (1999) (describing a study conducted on the New
Jersey turnpike, which showed that "73.2 percent of those stopped and arrested were black, while
only 13.5 percent of the cars on the road had a black driver or passenger"); Anthony C.
Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
956, 957-58 (1999) ("Between January 1995 and September 1996, of the 823 citizens detained for
drug searches on one stretch of Interstate 95, over seventy percent were African American."). See
also Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1030 (2002)
(empirical evidence suggests that police officers "are more likely to stop blacks and Latinas/os
than whites").
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Because the Framers did not adopt the Fourth Amendment to deal with
anything remotely similar to random drug tests, it is hard to see how the
amendment offers any real guidance in resolving such difficult
controversies.
V. Conclusion
Courts often have struggled when applying the Fourth Amendment to
random drug test controversies. The Supreme Court has decided random
drug testing cases in closely divided opinions, often overruling lower
federal courts.
To date, the Supreme Court has upheld random drug testing programs
in the public high schools. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 188 the
Justices upheld a random drug testing program for high school students
participating in interscholastic athletics. In Board of Education v. Earls,189
the Justices extended the Acton decision to uphold a random drug testing
program for all students who participated in extracurricular activities.
The Justices reached the correct results in these cases, but for the
wrong reason. A review of historical evidence demonstrates that the
Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment solely to prohibit physical
intrusions into residences, pursuant either to a general warrant, or no
warrant at all. The Fourth Amendment never was intended to govern many
of the other complex issues raised by government searches and seizures,
such as random drug tests. In both Acton and Earls, the Supreme Court
should have concluded that the Fourth Amendment simply was
inapplicable.
Random drug testing is not the only issue where courts have struggled
to apply the current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. If Fourth
Amendment scholars agree on anything, it is that current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is a mess.19 One cannot realistically expect any
improvement, as long as the Supreme Court continues to invoke the Fourth
188. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
189. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
190. See, e.g., Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, supra note 52, at 757 ("The Fourth
Amendment today is an embarrassment."); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985) ("The fourth amendment is the Supreme
Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such
a way that every effort to extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck."); Erik G.
Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 787-88 (1999) (each new Fourth
Amendment doctrine "is more duct tape on the Amendment's frame and a step closer to the
junkyard"); See also Kathryn R. Urbonya, A Fourth Amendment "Search" in the Age of
Technology: Postmodern Perspectives, 72 MISS. L.J. 447, 447 n.2 (2002) (citing frequent
complaints from scholars about the Fourth Amendment mess).
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Amendment in situations where the amendment never was intended to
apply.
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